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Social ontology and the modern corporation
Jeroen Veldman and Hugh Willmott
In an assessment of Lawson’s social ontological analysis of the modern corporation, 
we consider what is marginalized: the significance of the status and the effects of 
the separate legal entity (SLE). The SLE is conceived as a specific type of construct 
that is ascribed particular properties through its stabilization within and between 
different (legal and economic) discourses. By showing how the SLE, as a reified 
construct, is rendered meaningful, real and/or consequential, we illustrate how the 
‘social ontology’ of the modern corporation is radically contingent and inescap-
ably contested. Given that the social ontology of the corporation defies definitive 
specification, we regard the prospect of the completeness of its disclosure (e.g. by 
foregrounding a specific referent) as problematic. Indeed, any account of social 
ontology that foregrounds a specific referent is seen to obscure a political process 
in which the stabilization of the SLE rests on the contingent foregrounding of par-
ticular priorities. This leads us to reflect on the power-inflected social organization 
of knowledge generation. Key to the explication of social ontology, and with specific 
reference to the corporation, is not, as Lawson contends, the concept of ‘commu-
nity’ but the inescapability of contestation within relations of power that translate 
ontological openness into specific but precarious forms of ontic closure.
Key words: Corporation, Corporate governance, Industrial relations, Board, 
Management, Board duties, Shareholder primacy, Corporate reform, Corporate 
architecture, Social ontology, Organization theory, Political economy
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1. Introduction
Social ontology is at the heart of Tony Lawson’s thinking, including his analysis of the 
modern corporation. Offering an account of the general structure, nature and basic 
constituents of social reality, Lawson conceives of the examination of social ontology 
as ‘the study of the social realm, where the latter is taken as comprising those phe-
nomena whose coming into being and/or continuing existence depends necessarily on 
human beings and their interactions’ (Lawson, 2015A, p. 30). As Lawson convincingly 
argues, ‘taking an ontological stance … is unavoidable’ Lawson (2015C, p. 30); and it 
is by disclosing the ontological presuppositions of our stance that we make them avail-
able for critical scrutiny and thereby advance scholarly analysis. Conversely, when this 
explication is absent, the examination of ontological presuppositions is impeded, and 
the quality of analysis is correspondingly degraded (Lawson, 2015A).
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In his recent writings on social ontology, Lawson affirms his commitment to the 
view that ‘there exists a knowable (under some description) social reality and that 
economics should primarily address such matters as identifying and understanding 
real world economic structures, mechanisms, processes and events, etc.’ (Lawson in 
Pratten, 2015, p. 2). Within the domain of ‘real world economic structures’ (ibid.) is 
included the modern corporation. Given these conditions, Lawson contends that ‘As 
long as we are in possession of theories widely regarded as reliable, whose content can 
serve as premises for ontological analysis, there is reason to suppose that the presuppo-
sitions uncovered can relate to a reality beyond conceptions’ (Lawson, 2015A, p. 27). 
With this approach to social ontology, Lawson concludes that ‘the material conditions 
for a social science that is scientific in the sense of existing natural science are entirely 
present’ (Lawson, 2015D, pp. 413–14).
With specific reference to the modern corporation, Lawson notes that ‘the corpo-
ration is the site of an extraordinarily powerful set of mechanisms of social change in 
the modern world’, adding that ‘the structures at the heart of its workings appear to 
be relatively unexplored’ (Lawson, 2015B, p. 214). This shortcoming is ascribed to 
the neglect of social ontology, as exemplified in the lack of attention devoted to the 
question of the status of the corporation, or firm, as ‘a legal fiction’. What, Lawson 
asks rhetorically, does it mean to say that ‘the firm qua corporation is a legal fiction’? 
And he continues: ‘What precisely does the latter term mean, how does it relate to 
the notion of an ontological fiction and what does its use, if legitimate, imply for the 
constitution of the corporation?’ (Lawson, 2015C, p. 2). Lawson responds to these 
questions by contending that the corporation is more than merely a ‘legal fiction’ 
or a simple collection of contracts or assets (Lawson, 2015C, p. 6), a view that we 
share, but we disagree on what the ‘more than’ is, and how it is most instructively 
addressed.
Consistent with his approach to social ontology—in which ‘there is always some-
thing or someone real that is repositioned’ (Lawson, 2015C, p.  19), and in which 
‘the social category employed also picks out a definite feature of reality, that there 
is a definite referent’ (Lawson, 2015A, p. 43)—Lawson analyses the corporation in 
relation to a concrete referent. For Lawson, the modern corporation is, in essence, 
the ‘(sub) community’, albeit legally positioned, that is formally registered, within the 
wider, typically national (or international), community (Lawson, 2015C, pp. 9–10). 
As a ‘(sub)community’ constituted as a firm (Lawson, 2015C, p. 11; 2015B, p. 215), 
the corporation is ‘oriented to the collectively coordinated production of goods and/ or 
services to be sold to others, in a way that is intended to be advantageous to (at least 
some of) the community members’ (Lawson, 2015C, p. 15).
We will argue that Lawson’s attentiveness to the community as a concrete referent 
acknowledges, rather than ignores or disregards, the status of the corporation as a 
‘legal fiction’, but he overlooks the significance and effects of the separate legal entity 
(SLE). In the following section, we examine how the SLE is postulated as a reified 
construct, separate from the aggregation of individuals. The SLE is of key importance 
for the analysis of the corporation because it provides the basis for the development 
of a specific architecture and, in principle, bestows fiduciary duties upon the cor-
porate board toward the SLE as an ‘entity’, rather than to any specific (sub-)com-
munity. We then expand upon an attentiveness to the SLE as a reified construct by 
problematising the internal consistency of its status as posited by the legal epistemic 
community. Since the SLE presents a reified construct without a definite referent, 
  
it supports multiple conceptions of its status and referents, with accompanying per-
formative effects. Multiple conceptions of its status and referents—notably, the place-
holder conception versus the extended conception—are constructed and defended by 
(subsections of) the legal epistemic community. These differences and their associated 
contestations, we argue, illustrate and affirm our conjecture that ‘social ontology’ of 
the SLE and the modern corporation are radically contingent: they are inescapably 
contested; and their stabilisation and institutionalisation is the outcome of a political 
process.
We acknowledge that conceiving of the SLE in this way invites the accusation that it 
conflates the concreteness of the corporation with whatever discourses, or constructs, 
are invoked to characterize it, and so is forgetful of the ‘real’, material world. To address 
and disarm this objection, we argue, in the discussion section, that while the ontologi-
cal status of the SLE is elusive, recognition of how its reified status lacks a definite 
referent is necessary in order to understand the attribution of a host of properties to 
the modern corporation, and to understand the specific type of architecture that char-
acterises the modern corporation. More specifically, we argue that the SLE facilitates 
and secures the provision of privileges and protections to corporate constituencies on 
the basis of an architecture that associates and directs the benefits of the SLE toward 
the interests of multiple corporate constituencies. We explore how this conception of 
the ontological status of the corporation enables an appreciation of how competing 
framings of the SLE within and between multiple epistemic communities favour and 
perform differing kinds of corporate architecture(s), how these architectures condition 
the distribution of privileges and protections granted by the use of the SLE and how 
they exert significant effects in terms of political economy.
With regard to Lawson’s reflections on the corporation, our analysis draws attention 
to two issues. First, it illuminates how, when ontological priority is ascribed to a spe-
cific referent, such as community, it has the (unintended) consequence of displacing 
consideration of how the status and significance of the modern corporation and the 
SLE, as social constructs, is (re)produced. Second, this draws attention to the real, 
politico-economic effects of the social organization of knowledge claims, and specifi-
cally in relation to corporate governance and political economy.
2. The corporation and the separate legal entity (SLE)
Establishing the status of the SLE is critical, we contend, for understanding the signifi-
cance and influence of the modern corporation (Ireland, 2009). That is because it is 
a condition of possibility of the rights and associated benefits enjoyed by the modern 
corporation, resulting in far-reaching effects with regard to how businesses, nationally 
and globally, are organised.
The SLE is something of a misnomer, as it is not an ‘entity’ except in a strictly legal 
sense. It is a construct, postulated by the legal epistemic community (Haas, 2001),1 
1 While members of an epistemic community may share values and principled beliefs (e.g. with regard to 
the role, significance and authority of the law), there is scope for different interpretations of specific laws and 
judgments. Its members ‘are likely to disagree vehemently about some elements’ (Haas, 2001, pp. 11579–
80), albeit within a broadly shared frame of reference that can be differentiated from the epistemic commu-
nity of finance specialists, for example. Accordingly, we recognize that there may be ongoing contestation of 
the status of ideational constructs like the SLE within and between epistemic communities. Our distinctive 
focus is on the (temporary) stabilisation of the status of the SLE in broader and more enduring institutional 
  
that functions as ‘something distinct from the individual persons who constitute it’ 
(Brown, 1905, p. 4). It is a device used in legal reasoning that facilitates and signals ‘a 
transfer of rights and liabilities concerning ownership and contracting from individuals 
to registered corporate organizations’ (Deakin et al., 2017, p. 196). Notably, the UK 
Companies Acts of 1856 and 1862 ascribed ownership and liabilities of ‘the company’ 
to a separate legal entity (SLE), thereby providing a practical solution to a situation 
in which increasingly dispersed shareholders were no longer practically involved in 
functions of ownership and management. Crucially, the ascription of company assets 
and liabilities to the SLE restricted shareholders’ financial liability to the value of the 
shares and removed shareholders from the responsibilities of day-to-day management. 
As a consequence of the SLE’s reified status, the rights and obligations of ‘the corpora-
tion’, as contrasted to the partnership form, are not directly transferable to individuals 
(Hart, 1983, p. 41).
The development of the SLE, as a ‘juridical artifact’ with a separate existence—an 
‘it’, rather than a ‘they’—and the surrender of shareholders’ claims to ownership and 
to day-to-day management was part of an elaborate quid pro quo that made possible the 
development of a new organizational architecture in the form of the modern corpora-
tion (Veldman and Willmott, 2017). Since the SLE is not identical to the corporation 
or to its members, the assets and liabilities of ‘the corporation’ are separate from the 
individuals and constituent groups that constitute the corporation. As a consequence, 
the SLE, as a reified legal construct, can be creditor and debtor in its own right; it can 
continue despite entirely changing its personnel; and it can be insolvent while each of 
its shareholders remains solvent (and vice versa) (Brown, 1905). For these reasons, the 
material significance of the reified qualities of the SLE as a ‘juridical artifact’ cannot 
be ignored (Timberg, 1946, p. 542). Indeed, it has been argued that the SLE is crucial 
since ‘the difference between the organization and the legal entity is the key distinction 
in corporate law, and it must be borne in mind in all areas of company law and prac-
tice’ (Foster, 2006, p. 322; see also Biondi et al., 2007; Robé, 2011).
That said, the questions ‘What is it, which has the right?’ and ‘for what it stands, 
for what it means’ have not been credibly answered (Hart, 1983, p. 37, emphasis in 
original). The meaning of the SLE as an ‘it’, and its relation to the broader aggregation 
of individuals and/or constituencies making up ‘the corporation’, is a matter of on-
going, if ebbing and flowing, contestation (Blair, 2015; Ireland 1999; Lawson, 2015C ; 
Naffine, 2003). That such questions continue to be debated is explicable, we contend, 
in relation to the appeal of the various responses that have been offered. We now dem-
onstrate the possibility and significance of ascribing different identities to the SLE: as 
a placeholder; as a construct with an extended status for the provision of specific func-
tions; and as a fiction whose reified status is of negligible importance.
2.1 The placeholder conception of the SLE
In one formulation, the SLE is postulated as no more than a functional placeholder 
with no substantive status: ‘fictions are only ratiocinations which have no provable 
settings, such as company law, corporate governance codes and accounting regulations. In this context, we 
argue that the status of the SLE as a reified construct is first and foremost postulated and stabilized by a 
community of legal scholars and practitioners. In a later section, we explore the impact of a competing, law-
and-economics concept of the SLE.
  
counterpart in the inherent nature of things ... we need not be concerned with either 
the ontological or the epistemological status of the corporate fiction (i.e. its “reality” 
or its “truth value”)’ (Timberg, 1946, p. 540). When the SLE is conceptualised as a 
placeholder, it follows that the identification of the corporation as a ‘citizen’, ‘subject’, 
or ‘person’, and the projection of anthropomorphic qualities onto it, is a category mis-
take (Cohen, 1919; Freund, 2000 [1897]; Lampert, 2016; Radin, 1932; Vinogradoff, 
1924). Despite the rejection of a broader substantive status, the placeholder concep-
tion of the SLE still conceives of the SLE as a construct with reified properties, but 
does so for purely functional reasons.
Taking up the placeholder conception of the corporation as a basic way to under-
stand the status of the SLE, it is possible to provide a preliminary answer to the ques-
tion whether ‘the corporation is a mere mental construct, a legal device of some sort or 
something else’ (Lawson, 2015C, p.11). As the SLE is ascribed ownership and liabili-
ties as a fully separate legal construct with reified properties, which stands apart from 
the ‘community’ as an aggregation of individuals or groups, the corporation encom-
passes both the SLE and the community. As a result, the ‘community’ and the SLE 
offer different responses to the question ‘What is the corporation?’, and neither of 
them can be considered synonymous with ‘the corporation’.2
2.2 The extended conception of the SLE
It was during the nineteenth century that scholars and commentators sought to 
address issues and questions posed by the reified properties of the SLE, and particu-
larly in relation to the legal and political status of citizens and states (Maitland, 2003). 
At this time, multiple ‘founding myths’ were advanced—such as concession theory, 
entity theory and the aggregation of individuals theory. In relation to these founding 
myths, and as a product of an ongoing conflation between the SLE and a broader 
conception of the corporation, the status of the SLE and its relation to the corporation 
were variously interpreted as: a legal fiction relating to a (contractual) aggregation of 
individuals; the natural or spontaneous representation of a group or community, or 
of a constituent group or sub-community; a fully reified legal construct with the 
status of a legal ‘entity’, ‘subject’, ‘person’ or ‘citizen’; and combinations of these 
2 The specific development of the SLE sets the notion of the modern corporation apart from the notion of 
the firm, which is broader: ‘it is reasonable to regard partnerships, cooperatives, companies and corporations 
all as firms’ (Hodgson, 2002, p. 40).
  
interpretations (Avi-Yonah and Sivan, 2007; Blair, 2015; Gindis, 2009; Harris, 2006; 
Millon, 2001; Naffine 2003).
As these multiple interpretations reflected and performed an unstable, shifting and 
confusing conceptual basis for the SLE, they provided an accommodating context for 
the invocation of multiple referents and their use to embellish the properties, privileges 
and protections ascribed to the corporation. These included the attribution of (citizen-
ship) rights; the direct attribution of (contractual) agency to the SLE; the capacity to 
form corporate groups; a marked substantiation of the use of the ‘corporate veil’; and, 
in some jurisdictions, the capacity to sit on the board of another company as a direc-
tor in the capacity of a legal ‘entity’ (Bowman, 1996; Hodgson, 2002; Johnson, 2010; 
Maitland, 2003; Mayer, 1989; Nace, 2003; Robé, 2011; Tricker, 2015).
The invocation of multiple referents inspires and supports the basis for an extended 
conception of the SLE that accommodates the attribution of properties, privileges and 
protections far beyond the basic placeholder conception. Despite social and academic 
contestation of this accommodation of an extended conception of the SLE in corpo-
rate theory, ‘pragmatism’ became accepted in US and British legal scholarship from 
the 1920s as a justification for maintaining the parallel use of the placeholder and 
extended conceptions (Dewey, 1926; Harris, 2006; Lawson, 1957). In turn, accom-
modation of multiple referents and their effects rendered the sole, doctrinal use of the 
narrow placeholder conception increasingly untenable. Today, both the placeholder 
and extended conceptions of the SLE remain in service (see Blair, 2015).
3. The holy grail of social ontology
To recap, we have argued that the postulation of the SLE is crucial for the development 
of the modern corporation as a specific legal form. Its reified status has material conse-
quences in the form of shaping legal, contractual and economic relationships with, and 
within, the corporation (Foster, 2006, p. 318); for the capacity to attribute rights and 
protections; and for the capacity to form corporate groups. It significantly influences 
the set-up of the conceptual architecture and related corporate governance structure 
of the modern corporation (Foster, 2006, p. 319; also see below), facilitating a number 
of other innovations, like rentier shareholdership, minority shareholder protections, a 
secondary share market and professional management (Biondi et al., 2007; Ciepley, 
2013; Ireland, 1999; Johnson, 2010; Lamoreaux, 1998; Stoljar, 1973). Despite its sig-
nificance, the precise status of the SLE remains unstable.
To understand why such an important construct has such an unclear status, it is 
relevant to appreciate how, within the legal epistemic community, the ‘law is grounded 
only on itself ’ (Teubner, 1997, p. 764). As F. H. Lawson (1957, p. 914) has put it, ‘all 
legal relations are abstract and exist not in fact but only in contemplation of law’. He 
continues that juristic concepts are ‘ideal expressions of social facts, and ... their ide-
ality is possible only by means of the abstraction which the jurist deliberately makes 
in his account of society’ (Hallis, 1978, p. 163). As ‘ideal expressions of social facts’, 
the status of juristic concepts is not verifiable by any empirical test: ‘Legal personality, 
estates and contracts are parts of a world of their own, which is in some way related 
to the world of fact but is separate from them. It is an artificial world whose mem-
bers are to some extent arbitrary, though not irrationally, created to serve certain pur-
poses’ (Lawson, 1957, p. 913). Crucially, it is important to understand how the status, 
  
qualities and relations of all legal constructs are created and performed by the applica-
tion of rules that function internally to the legal system of representations. That is why 
the notion of a ‘legal fiction’ can point to ‘terms or categories that have no referents’ 
(Lawson, 2015C, p. 18).
Any referent in this system of representations is merely an implied referent,3 so it 
is possible to posit and use constructs like the SLE without presuming closure with 
regard to referents, or to the (ontological) status of such constructs. For this reason, 
it is not ‘always something or someone real that is repositioned’ (ibid. p. 19). It is not 
necessarily an ‘individual’ that ‘becomes the bearer or agent of novel positional powers 
and specifically rights and obligations’ (ibid., p. 9). And it is not ‘the firm positioned as 
a company [that acquires] legal personhood or [becomes] positioned as a legal person’ 
(ibid., p. 18; see also n. 2). Although the SLE may have acquired functions on the basis 
of its identification in relation to the ‘person’ or the ‘(sub-)community’ as referents, 
this identification does not reflect an exclusive relation to any of those referents.
As there is no direct relation between a ‘legal fiction’ and a concrete referent, it is 
not necessarily a misrepresentation when a legal rule is applied ‘to a case for which it 
was not originally designed or intended to cover’ (Lawson, 2015C, p. 19). It is indeed 
possible to infer multiple classes of ‘persons’, interpreted as ‘persona ficta’ or ‘bundles 
of rights and duties’, within the category of the legal ‘subject’. It is therefore not a type 
of (ontological) category mistake that leads to the identification of the SLE as a legal 
‘person’ (Lawson, 2015C, p. 18). And it is implausible to claim that the corporation 
presents a type of ‘agent of rights and obligations intended only for human beings’ 
(Lawson, 2015B, p. 218). Instead, the (ontological) status of any type of legal fiction—
like the legal entity, subject, person, the SLE or the corporation—is equivalent in its 
status. As an empty signifier, it may be filled with whatever contents members of the 
legal epistemic community see fit, within the historically defined boundaries of their 
worldview, to propose, challenge, reject or accept (Dewey, 1926; Hallis, 1978; Hart 
1983; Foster, 2006; Veldman, 2016A).
Our brief overview of the legal conceptions of the SLE has provided an initial 
response to Lawson’s question(s): ‘What precisely does the ... term [legal fiction] 
mean, how does it relate to the notion of an ontological fiction and what does its use, 
if legitimate, imply for the constitution of the corporation?’ (Lawson, 2015C, p. 2). 
The SLE, we have argued, is an ideational construct whose indeterminate status is, in 
practice, socially defined by its postulation within the legal epistemic community. As a 
construct that is postulated with reified qualities in that legal epistemic community, it 
exerts performative effects; and it does so irrespective of its relation to a specific refer-
ent or its theoretical or ontological consistency.
We now turn to a consideration of the effects of the postulation of the SLE as a con-
struct with a reified status. In doing so, it is relevant to underscore how, within the legal 
epistemic community, it is possible to posit and use legal fictions as constructs with 
no more than an implied referent, and so the (ontological) status of constructs, even 
those with a reified status, are subject to constant (re)negotiation and re-formulation 
within and between epistemic communities that are embedded in a wider network of 
3 This helps to explain how concepts like shell companies can exist: ‘The legal entity can be almost totally 
independent of any significant substrate, whether personal or organisational.… ABC Limited need only have 
the most tenuous of connections to human beings. Indeed, such a connection can often be disregarded for 
practical purposes’ (Foster, 2006, p. 321).
  
asymmetrical social relations. In the next section, our focus is primarily upon the recep-
tion of the SLE outside the legal epistemic community. In particular, we are interested 
in how the SLE may be assumed either to have an implied referent, or to be of marginal 
or background significance. More specifically, we explore how the capacity for constant 
(re)negotiation and re-formulation of the substantive status of the SLE as a reified con-
struct is at once exemplified and displaced by the hegemony of the Nexus of Contracts 
(NoC) theory which exerts concrete effects in terms of fostering a new architecture of 
the modern corporation, with specific outcomes in terms of political economy.
4. The politics of (re)formation of the SLE
Our analysis of the SLE as a capacious and contested construct has placed in question 
the coherence of proposing, or adjudicating between, ostensibly authoritative knowledge 
claims about the essence of the SLE and/or the credibility of specific referents. In certain 
respects, our position is consistent with Lawson’s observation that ‘Analyses of the firm 
emanating from economics … have focused on providing very particular (functionalist) 
explanations of the existence of the firm’ while ‘contributors to legal studies or corporate 
governance, inspired especially by the “law and economics movement” … have tended 
to accept (in an overly uncritical fashion) these contributions from economics as realis-
tic, and sought in turn to use them in their interpretations of the legal system’ (Lawson, 
2015B, p. 227). While we have distinguished the corporation from the firm (see note 
2), we agree that the adjudication of the status of the corporation, and of the SLE more 
specifically, extends beyond the legal epistemic community; and the engagement by epis-
temic communities has concrete effects in terms of political economy.
To demonstrate the role of contestation and (contingent) stabilization in shaping 
the meaning and effects of the SLE, we return initially to its historical development. 
Through the development of the SLE in the nineteenth century, the ownership of 
shares was distanced from the liabilities that, in the partnership form, had been asso-
ciated with partners’ direct ownership of assets. For partners, those liabilities were 
unlimited, thereby making them collectively responsible for each other’s financial 
(mis-)judgments and debts. The responsiveness of the SLE to the risks of forming, or 
joining, partnerships and their associated restrictions in combination with the privi-
leges offered by the SLE4 were the basis for a quid pro quo in which shareholders came 
to have an indirect, rather than direct, claim on corporate assets (Hodgson, 2002; 
Ireland, 1999). Rupturing the indivisibility of ownership and control present in unlim-
ited liability partnerships (although it was not entirely removed in the new architec-
ture, as shareholders continue to appoint directors) repositioned shareholders as a 
largely external constituency with limited claims and responsibilities compared to the 
investor-partners in the unlimited liability partnership.
In the new corporate architecture the interests of shareholders are included but no 
longer equivalent, or reducible, to those of ‘the corporation’ (Millon, 2014). As a result 
of this repositioning, the role of the board became central, with its members being 
required to attend to the interests of the corporation, interpreted as an ‘entity’ (Millon, 
4 The modern corporation offered, i.e., a perpetual business form, limited liability—i.e., liability being 
limited to the loss of the value of the shares, minority shareholder protections, and a secondary share market 
in which shares could be easily transferred (Ireland, 1999; Johnson, 2010; Lawson, 2015C, p. 21; Veldman 
and Willmott, 2017).
  
2013). Over time, this repositioning has prompted a perplexing question concerning 
board duties: if the fiduciary duties of the board are directed at the ‘entity’ or ‘the cor-
poration’, in whose interest is the corporation to be run? (see esp. Berle, 1931, 1947, 
1954; Biondi et al., 2007; Dodd, 1931; Mizruchi and Hirschmann, 2010; Robé, 2011). 
This question makes the historical development of conceptions of the ‘entity’ and its 
relation to the corporation central.
During its initial development in the nineteenth century, the SLE mainly served to 
increase the availability, and to reduce the cost, of capital, especially for more specu-
lative ventures. By allowing capital to be pooled, it spread and reduced risk amongst 
growing numbers of (rentier) shareholders. Inasmuch as these features of the SLE 
could be related to its conception as a placeholder, directors’ duties could be interpreted 
as protecting and increasing the assets of the SLE, and thereby indirectly advancing 
the interests of the shareholders in securing capital growth (see Biondi et al., 2007; 
Bowman, 1996; Chandler, 2002 [1977]; Deakin 2012; Johnson, 2010; Roy, 1999).
However, as the legal conception of the SLE shifted from a placeholder to an 
extended conception, this alternative interpretation of the SLE as an ‘entity’ fostered 
new possibilities, such as the attribution of contractual agency and amendment rights, 
and the construction of corporate groups. As these developments coincided with a 
shift in the organization and concentration of markets toward an increasingly oligopo-
listic model, the corporation became an object of concern, a target of criticism and so 
subject to challenge. Expressions of concern mounted about its impacts on economic 
organization, including its socially divisive consequences and the vacuum of control 
and responsibility at the centre of an emergent ‘corporate capitalism’. These criti-
cisms of the SLE were met in the early twentieth century with responses that inter alia 
insisted upon the vital role of the modern corporation for economic coordination, 
and specifically in counteracting a perceived communist threat (see Bowman, 1996; 
Carroll et  al., 2012; Chandler, 2002 [1977]; Djelic, 2013; Hannah, 2010 [1976]; 
Johnson, 2012; Marens, 2012; Mizruchi and Hirschmann, 2010; Roy, 1999). Political 
and economic concerns about the effects of the modern corporation thus provided a 
background to the pragmatism in the 1920s in legal circles referenced in Section 2.
Following the 1929 crash, concerns about ‘corporate capitalism’ provided a context 
for Berle and Means’ (2007 [1932]) landmark analysis of the corporation. Berle and 
Means argued that in the first decades of the twentieth century the formal, legal sepa-
ration of ownership of shares from the responsibilities and liabilities of control had 
been followed by increasingly diffused share ownership. As ‘the atom of ownership and 
control’ had both theoretically and practically been split, control over corporations had 
passed, by default, to a cadre of professional, but essentially unaccountable managers.5 
Equivocating between concerns about the development of the modern corporation 
into an increasingly dominant institution under the control of unaccountable ‘princes’, 
and supporting the institution of the modern corporation as a vehicle of private wealth 
accumulation, Berle and Means proposed that the legitimacy of the modern corpora-
tion under managerial control depended upon its smooth and progressive evolution 
5 Berle and Means spoke of ‘managers’ as both directors and executive managers (officers) (Johnson and 
Millon, 2005)
  
into a quasi-social institution capable of serving the interests of a broad set of constitu-
encies6 (Khurana, 2007; Moore and Rebérioux, 2007).
In the era of ‘managerial capitalism’, beginning in the 1930s and extending to the 
1970s, a concern to re-legitimise the modern corporation justified the expansion of 
discretionary space for board members and executives within the architecture of the 
modern corporation. But this exercise of discretion was conceived in relation to ‘the 
entity’ or ‘the corporation’ as a duty to recognise and adjudicate between diverse 
claimants on the corporation and, in some readings, by all the stakeholders who are 
affected by its activities (Berle and Means, 2007 [1932]; Biondi et al., 2007; Ciepley, 
2013; Drucker, 2006 [1946]; Lan and Heracleous, 2010; Millon, 2014; Mizruchi and 
Hirschmann, 2010; Segrestin and Hatchuel, 2011).
During the 1970s, the ‘social contract’ that stabilised and justified the architecture 
of ‘managerial capitalism’ was tested by slowing economic activity, fiscal crises and the 
socially destabilising impacts of stagflation. In this context, a more market-oriented 
conception of the corporation was presented as an alternative. In the ‘nexus of con-
tracts’ (NoC) theory, developed mostly by the Chicago School of law and economics 
(Van Horn, 2009; Van Horn and Mirowksi, 2009), the modern corporation is re-
imagined as comprising a set of contractual relations among self-interested, atomistic 
individuals. Consistent with this market-centred conception of the corporation, the 
SLE is simultaneously acknowledged and disregarded as an inconsequential ‘legal fic-
tion’ with no substantive status (Bratton, 1989; Friedman, 1970; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976), although the privileges, protections and architecture provided by the extended 
conception of the SLE are maintained.
The ‘intellectual shamanism’ (Ireland, 2005, p. 81) of NoC envisions a corporate 
architecture in which managerial executives are typified as ‘agents’ who, in a direct 
contractual relation, respond exclusively to shareholders as their ‘principals’. In this 
dyadic governance relation, fiduciary duties and accountability are reoriented to the 
creation of shareholder value as measured by short-term market valuation. The claims 
of all other stakeholders are structurally excluded from this relation (Ireland, 2005; 
Marens and Wicks, 1999; Millon, 2014). Consideration and protection of other stake-
holders’ interests is contingent upon the calculation by managers that it is instrumen-
tally relevant and effective for maximising shareholder value. NoC has proved alluring, 
especially to shareholders, as the privileges and protections provided by the SLE are 
retained, while the institutional protections for other stakeholders developed in the 
‘managerialist’ era are denied any legitimate purpose and so can, and should, be dis-
mantled (Aglietta and Rebérioux, 2005; Armour et al., 2003; Davis, 2009; Dore, 2008; 
Jacoby, 2008; Jansson et al., 2016; Johnson, 2012; Khurana, 2007; Lazonick, 2014; 
Millon, 2014).
We have noted how the capacious and contested status of the SLE as a reified con-
struct postulated by the legal epistemic community invites and accommodates an 
on-going contestation of knowledge claims about the SLE and the credibility of its 
6 ‘The institution here envisaged calls for analysis, not in terms of business enterprise but in terms of 
social organization. On the one hand, it involves a concentration of power in the economic field comparable 
to the concentration of … political power in the national state. On the other hand, it involves the interrelation 
of a wide diversity of economic interests—those of the “owners” who supply capital, those of the workers 
who “create,” those of the consumers who give value to the products of enterprise, and above all those of the 
control who wield power’ (Berle and Means (2007 [1932], pp. 309–10).
  
relation to specific referents. Not only is this contestation and the use of shifting stabi-
lisations problematic in relation to the consistency of ideas about this construct and for 
understanding the direct effects of the reified status of the SLE; it is also problematic 
in relation to the provision of a clear view on corporate architecture through which 
risks, rewards and protections to corporate constituencies and broader stakeholders 
are allocated.
5. Discussion
We began by noting that Lawson’s approach to the corporation, and specifically the 
foregrounding of the community as a concrete referent, is based upon the presump-
tion that a particular, ‘realist’ conception of ‘social ontology’ provides a sound basis for 
scientific inquiry (Lawson, 2012, p. 346). Lawson contends that in order to advance a 
‘(realist) orientation’, in which ‘the social category employed also picks out a definite 
feature of reality, that there is a definite referent’ (Lawson, 2015A, p. 43), it makes 
sense to argue that ‘there is always something or someone real that is repositioned’ 
(Lawson, 2015C, p. 19). More specifically, it is claimed that what is ‘positioned as a 
company’ (Lawson, 2015C, p. 18) is, in fact, the (sub)community, aggregated as a firm 
(Lawson, 2015C, pp. 11, 16), which ‘acquires positional rights and obligations, just as 
a (positioned) human individual might’ (Lawson, 2015C, p. 10).
By contrast, our analysis has drawn attention to the significance of how the SLE is 
conceived as a reified construct, separate from the aggregation of individuals (N+1) 
in the legal epistemic community; and that this reified status of the SLE is central to 
the specificity of the modern corporation and its architecture (Millon, 2014; Robé, 
2011; Stout, 2012). Although we agree with Lawson that the legal epistemic com-
munity makes possible access to ‘(sets of) rights and obligations’ (Lawson, 2015C, 
p. 19) through the SLE, we contend that the status of the SLE, like any other ‘legal 
fiction’, is ascribed by the legal epistemic community on the basis of a self-enclosed 
set of ontological assumptions (Veldman, 2016A). Hence, the SLE, as a ‘legal fiction’, 
can be interpreted as a concretely reified construct, and yet doesn’t need to relate to a 
concrete referent, like ‘community’.
In advancing this position, we also accept that ‘through ... a process of incorporation ... 
a (limited) company, is not going to be somehow rendered thereby an ontological 
fiction or non-existent as an entity. Nor of course will it be a real person’ (Lawson, 
2015C, p. 16). But this is not ‘because any firm is a real community’ (Lawson, 2015C, 
p.  16). Nor is it because the firm or the community is repositioned as a company 
(Lawson, 2015C, p. 18). Rather, the relation is the other way around: the reality of 
SLE, as a ‘legal fiction’, is derived ‘from differences in legal outcomes, which in their 
turn generate effects in objective reality’ (Foster, 2006, p.  319). The SLE, like any 
other legal fiction, can be ‘(re)positioned’ by the legal epistemic community to relate 
to multiple referents.
We have demonstrated the relevance and coherence of this approach to social ontol-
ogy in three ways. First, we explored how the reified status of the SLE, distinct from 
the aggregation of individuals (N+1), makes it possible to distinguish between the 
corporation, the SLE and the ‘community’. Second, we demonstrated how what is 
postulated as a reified construct by the legal epistemic community does not need to 
relate to a concrete referent. We showed how the status of the SLE can accommodate, 
and oscillate between, its conception as a narrow functional placeholder with specific 
  
attributions of ownership and liabilities, and a more expansive, extended conception 
that provides the basis for a wide use of referents, and hence (much) broader attribu-
tions, including attributions of (contractual) agency and (citizenship) rights and pro-
tections (Blair, 2015; Bowman, 1996; Maitland, 2003; Mayer, 1989; Naffine, 2003). 
We also noted how, in the absence of a direct referent, a resort to ‘pragmatism’ upholds 
these conflicting conceptions of the status of the SLE in the legal epistemic community 
(Millon, 2001, pp. 3–4). Third, we considered how the reified status of the SLE as a 
reified construct is central to the provision of a specific corporate architecture; and we 
reviewed how the adoption and institutionalisation of specific ideas of the (ontological) 
status of the SLE in different socio-economic contexts has real-world effects in terms 
of political economy.
We have commended a conception of the SLE as a functionally constituted con-
struct (Timberg, 1946). This approach reminds us that whatever is deemed to exist 
in the guise of the SLE is the product of a transient and fragile consensus within and 
between epistemic communities; and that temporary stabilisation is the outcome of a 
political process that has real-world consequences. The SLE and associated legal fic-
tions are, on this account, social constructs precariously stabilised within political-eco-
nomic relations. This approach discredits the quest for ontological neatness or ultimate 
coherence. Its challenge to conventional, ‘realist’ wisdom has been exemplified in our 
analysis of how a series of de-stabilizations and re-stabilisations of the SLE have estab-
lished, revised and justified privileges and protections with regard to how, through the 
medium of the modern corporation and the SLE, wealth is created, appropriated and 
distributed (Ireland, 2005).
We agree with Lawson that the status of constructs such as ‘entity’, ‘subject’ or 
‘agent’, and their relation to specific referents, is an important issue. Yet, in our view, 
the effort to identify a direct referent is ill conceived, as it mystifies more than it illumi-
nates the underlying problematic. It is more instructive to focus upon the invocation, 
stabilization and enactment of key constructs in specific types of theory in relation 
to their conditioning by, and their consequences for, political economy. In sum, our 
approach furnishes the elements for a detailed examination of the historical engage-
ment and social definition of the SLE that relate its conflicted status not only to mul-
tiple stabilisations within and between epistemic communities but also to the concrete 
consequences of specific stabilisations in terms of political economy.
Our approach to social ontology combines a consideration of significant aspects of 
the role of the SLE as a social construct with the real-world effects and consequences 
of its stabilization within and between epistemic communities. This, we submit, is in 
line with Lawson’s sense of social reality as ‘an emergent, open-ended, structured, 
transformational process in motion, in which the parts are constituted in and through 
their (changing) relations to each other’ (Lawson, 2015A, p. 43). However, in distinc-
tion to Lawson we have conjectured that an entity ‘that can reasonably be categorized 
as social’, such as the SLE, is not ‘as real or objective as’, ontologically continuous with 
or equivalent to ‘the objects studied within the traditional “natural” sciences’ (Lawson, 
2012, p. 346). As a result, our approach to social ontology accepts that the legal epis-
temic community in principle is able to exhibit ‘‘cognitive openness’ (Deakin, 2015, p. 
176). We agree that ‘the definition of a juridical concept and its application to a given 
factual context [also] presuppose at least a certain degree of connection between legal 
forms and the wider social reality of which they form a part’ (Deakin, 2015, p. 182; see 
  
also Gordon, 1984). However, we note that after two centuries of deliberation by the 
legal epistemic community, a clear delineation of the status of the SLE and the modern 
corporation hasn’t (yet) materialized (Veldman, 2010). It is therefore with a measure 
of scepticism that we look forward to the anticipated ‘validation’ (Deakin, 2015, p. 
1), or falsification, of the theoretical and empirical claims that abound in relation to 
the status and effects of the SLE and the modern corporation. For us, the prospect of 
validation and falsification seems remote. That is not only because, under the banner 
of ‘pragmatism’, the legal epistemic community has accepted both the placeholder and 
the extended conceptions of the SLE in order to secure its practical, material effects. It 
is also because the SLE is an object of contestation within and between epistemic com-
munities. In tandem, pragmatism and contestation point toward the dynamic role of 
political economy in disrupting the stabilisation that is necessary to validate or falsify 
the meaning of the SLE and the nature of the modern corporation.
6. Conclusion
Our purpose has been to give serious consideration to the multiplicity of assumptions 
about the SLE as a construct that defines, or at least conditions, the status, effects and 
institutional structure of the modern corporation. This has led us to make three claims 
in relation to Lawson’s assumptions about social ontology. First, we have identified the 
separate legal entity as a reified social construct formulated within a specific epistemo-
logical community whose concrete effects are mediated by processes of contestation 
over its status and significance. Second, and relatedly, we have suggested that striv-
ing to establish an authoritative, definitive social ontology of the modern corporation 
disattends to the contingent, problematic status of the separate legal entity. Third, we 
have underscored the social organization of knowledge claims, particularly in relation 
to multiple ways of stabilising the SLE as a social construct and the politico-economic 
conditions and consequences of its recurrent de-stabilizations and re-stabilizations.
Each historical stabilization of the SLE has been conceived as a consequence of 
groups mobilising available resources that bestow and sustain material and symbolic 
advantage. Our approach invites a keener appreciation of the assumptions underpin-
ning particular stabilizations; the ways in which these stabilizations have been pro-
duced historically; the effects of those stabilizations and their benefits for particular 
groups; and, more broadly, it invites a closer attentiveness to the dynamics of contesta-
tion in which diverse parties—including academics working within numerous discipli-
nary fields and diverse stakeholders—mobilise resources as they engage in struggles 
to institutionalise, de-institutionalise and re-institutionalise preferred versions of the 
corporate form (Bowman, 1996; Ciepley, 2013; Johnson, 2010; Nace, 2003; Perrow, 
2002; Wilks, 2013). In sum, we suggest that ‘political contestation’, and not ‘commu-
nity’, is key to the explication of the social ontology of the modern corporation.
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